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―There is something called black in America and there is something called white in
America and I know them when I see them, but I will forever be unable to explain the
meaning of them . . . .‖[1]

Introduction
Since 1967, the number of multi-racial individuals with some African ancestry living in
the United States has increased dramatically as a result of increased out-marriage by
black Americans and the immigration of large numbers of multiracial individuals from
Mexico, the Caribbean, as well as Central and Latin America. With the removal of
national origin quotas in the 1965 immigration reform law,[2] more people with some
African ancestry have entered this country over the past forty years than at any other time
in our history.[3] Consequently, the face of late twentieth and early twenty-first century
America has changed, as have attitudes about race, especially about persons with some
African ancestry.
Much of the conventional public, political and judicial rhetoric, however, does not
reflect the heterogeneity of African Americans. The ongoing rhetoric of mono-racialism
may be the byproduct of at least two factors. Legally, the law played a dominant role in
constructing and reifying a ―single‖ black race. Throughout the twentieth century,
blackness in America was ―seen as so self-evident‖ that one was considered black if
one‘s African ancestry was visible or known.[4] Politically, scholars have long
contended that diversity within the black community was suppressed for strategic
purposes, so that mono-racialism became a unifying and primary organizing principle in
the fight against race discrimination.[5] These legal and political accounts of blackness
continue to this day.
Contemporary rhetoric still assumes that black Americans are a homogenous group
with a shared common identity and history.[6] Nevertheless, ―[i]mportant shifts in the
composition of the U.S. population and contemporary constructions and representations
of biological and cultural mixture, problematize the very nature of[b]lack identity and the
[b]lack experience in [twenty-first century] America.‖[7] As legal scholar Kenneth Karst
predicted more than a decade ago, the static and monolithic racial legal category ―black‖
has changed “[a]s perceptions of race meld further into perceptions of culture.”[8]

Recently the Pew Research Center found that ―nearly four-in-ten African Americans
(37%) say that blacks can no longer be thought of as a single race‖ because of increasing
diversity within that community.[9] Unsurprisingly, perceptions about the
disaggregation of blackness are stronger among younger black Americans, particularly
those who were born after Loving v. Virginia, the post-Loving generation, who are more
likely than their older counterparts to report that blacks are no longer a single race. More
importantly, the Pew study merely quantifies what many black Americans already know;
class- and generational-based differences in values and experiences transcend racial
differences, even for black Americans. Some even argue that we are living in a postblack era.[10]
Many members of the post-Loving generation, came of age in the 1990s with no
memories of de jure racial segregation laws or the need for the 1960s civil rights
legislation to combat overt racial discrimination. Accordingly, they see race, racism and
identity through different lens. In other words, we are witnessing a significant
generational shift in thinking that is beginning to be reflected in popular culture and
scholarly literature about race and identity, but not in the courts. American judges and
policy-makers, composed primarily of the children of Brown v. Board of Education,[11]
remain stuck in a racial jurisprudence and rhetoric of the late twentieth century that
focuses on intentional and overt mono-racial discrimination. There is little recognition
by courts of the multiple levels of race-related discrimination or that persons with some
African ancestry may experience discrimination differently.
To illustrate the changing perceptions of identity for individuals with partial African
ancestry – those born shortly before and post-Loving – and the implication of black
pluralism on contemporary anti-discrimination law, this chapter analyzes the experiences
of and public dialogues about children of interracial parentage and how their differential
treatment by non-blacks, as well as blacks, raises legal issues courts are not prepared to
address. The first Loving era child is President Barack Hussein Obama, born six years
before the Loving decision to a black Kenyan father and a white Kansan mother, and
raised in Hawaii. The Harvard Law School graduate‘s skin tone and other physical
features identify him as someone with African ancestry. He also self identifies culturally
as a black American; nevertheless, because of his interracial parentage controversy arose
during his successful runs for the U.S. Senate seat and presidency about whether he is
―authentically‖ black.
The blackness of the second Loving era child, Maria O‘Brien Hylton, born seven years
before the Supreme Court case to an Afro-Cuban mother and white Australian father of
Irish ancestry, also was publicly questioned. Unlike President Obama, Hylton‘s physical
appearance is more racially ambiguous, and her identity is further complicated by the
Latin roots of her mother. She made headlines nationally when black members of the
Northwestern University Law School community objected to her hiring as a minority
faculty member, arguing that Hylton was not black enough because of her light skin tone
and alleged lack of cultural identity.[12]

The public controversies surrounding the racial identities of President Obama and
Professor Hylton reflect contemporary public discourses on race, and suggest the
potential legal implications of being ―black‖ in post-black America. These discussions
signal how the generational shift in race discourse impacts Americans with interracial
parentage and some African ancestry. This transition raises interesting questions about
the continued viability of late twentieth century anti-discrimination race jurisprudence,
especially as applied to people traditionally ―raced‖ or identified as black or African
American. Discussions about their racial identity provide an opportunity to examine the
struggle occurring within the community of Afro-descendants, and larger American
community, about the meaning and measurement of blackness and ―racial authenticity‖ in
21st century America.
As the following discussion suggests, the notion of ―racial authenticity‖ is illusive. It
operates slightly differently for individuals whose physical appearance comports with
conventional notions of blackness than for more racially ambiguous individuals. The
focus of discussion for racially distinctive individuals like President Obama is whether
their interracial parentage makes them less black socially, less representative of perceived
black political interests and less likely to experience traditional forms of race-based
discrimination. More specifically, one emerging question is whether mixed-race
individuals are more likely to experience situational blackness[13] - whether one can be
black for some but not for other purposes, and if so, when one is black for antidiscrimination purposes.
This question is even more sharply drawn when questions about racial authenticity arise
for individuals whose African ancestry is less apparent. As this chapter explains, the
overriding question in both cases is whether interracial parentage confers some type of
benefit and disadvantage on Afro-descendant children not experienced by individuals
whose formal racial classification is black, and if so whether anti-discrimination law
should take these differences into account.
II. Loving’s Children in Post-Black America: Barack Obama and Racial
Authenticity
Historically, the law discouraged interracial parentage and penalized their offspring by
consigning children to the ―lower‖ of the two racial categories. But in post-black
America, many of these children refuse to be defined primarily under one racial
category.[14] Nevertheless, the public remains fixated on assigning a single racial group
to mixed-race children rather than accepting how they characterize themselves. The
public discussions about President Obama‘s race illustrate this problem.
Although the media initially characterized Barak Obama as black or African American,
others were not so sure. During his 2004 senatorial campaign, his Republican opponent,
Alan Keyes, an African American, suggested that because Obama is not descended from
enslaved West Africans he really is not an African American. Obama‘s African ancestry,
physical features—brown skin tone, hair texture, and broad nose—and self- identification
as a black or African American is insufficient, in Keyes‘s mind, to make him an

―authentic‖ African American. Thus, for Keyes, authentic blackness is based on a direct
connection or link to the slave experiences of West Africans in the Americas and the
segregation that followed into the mid-twentieth century, before Loving and the 1965
immigration reform. Thus, persons with any African ancestry who lack this background
are racially suspect.
Indeed, some have intimated that a black individual‘s lack of ancestral ties to slavery
constituted a positive attribute. During the 2008 presidential race, political scientist Ron
Walters, an African American, built on Keyes‘ distinction suggesting that the absence of
a direct ancestral link to enslaved West Africans benefitted Obama in his run for the
presidency. According to Walters, Obama was a more acceptable presidential candidate
to white Americans than earlier black candidates, like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton.
Unlike Obama, Jackson and Sharpton, descendents of slaves, embodied ―the traditional
African-American identity [which] is more threatening [to whites], because it raises . . .
the culpability of whites in slavery.‖[15]
Linking authentic blackness to American slavery is problematic. The Keyes/Walters
definition of African American over emphasizes the connection between slavery and antiblack bias rather than dominance of a white supremacy ideology in America. Neil
Gotanda calls this approach ―historical race‖, a concept that ―embodies past and
continuing racial subordination, . . . [that represents] the meaning of race . . . the
[Supreme] Court contemplates when it applies ‗strict scrutiny‘ to racially disadvantaging
government conduct.‖[16] This definition framed in the American slave experience
seems to exclude someone like President Obama even though he has the physical
attributes of blackness, self-identifies as black and may experience race-based
discrimination.
Questions about President Obama‘s racial authenticity also tend to conflate self-identified
race (cultural race) with historic race. When the readers of nationally syndicated
columnist Clarence Page, an African American, wrote asking him to stop calling Obama
―black‖ because of his interracial parentage, Page reminded his readers that Obama selfidentifies as black. Page asserts Obama‘s cultural race as proof of his blackness whereas
his readers seem to reflect Ron Walters‘s belief that Obama‘s perceived identity status is
different from conventionally black Americans because of his interracial parentage.
Historically, the offspring of ―interracial reproduction‖ were classified as mulatto, or
some fractional label. In most instances, this label had no legal significance in the United
States; one was still black. This traditional ascription of race, however, was not applied
to Presidenti Obama. Even though he looks like many black American products of
slave era miscegenation, his racial authenticity is suspect. The public saw him as
different from conventional earlier miscegenated black Americans because his mother is
white and his father is a Kenyan not descended from enslaved West Africans. Further,
his Kenyan father lived briefly in United States in the 1960s and never experienced the
hardships and deprivations caused by Jim Crow laws of the late nineteenth and first half
of the twentieth century. Thus, Walters and Keyes suggest that President Obama‘s
interracial parentage translates into a different identity status.

While the Supreme Court‘s anti-discrimination jurisprudence is grounded in the
American experiences of West African slaves and their descendants, it has never limited
relief for race-based discrimination to this group of black Americans. If a court was to
consider President Obama‘s racial status, it would likely to conclude that his is black. In
1995, a Massachusetts court was called upon to determine the legal racial status of twin
brothers, Philip and Paul Malone, who, after identifying themselves as black, obtained
positions as firefighters with the Boston Fire Department as a result of an affirmative
action program.[17] Subsequently, the Malone brothers, who looked and lived white,
were fired for filing falsified applicants after a hearing officer determined that they were
not black. The brothers appealed saying that there was no criteria for determining racial
identification and that thus the Department only required self-identification.
In an unreported decision the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County upheld the firing
saying that the brothers failed to establish their claimed racial identity using any of three
types of evidence: (1) phenotypical – a visual observation of their features, (2)
genealogical – using documentary evidence to establish black ancestry, and (3) cultural –
providing evidence that the family held itself out as black and were considered black by
their community.[18] While the Malone brothers failed to satisfy any of these tests,
President Obama easily meets all three tests including the genealogical test because legal
blackness in America is defined as any known African ancestry. [19]
The questioning of President Obama‘s racial authenticity confuses ―[t]ranscendent
community interests . . . with a simplistic belief that the African-American community is
a monolithic entity in which all people of color live identical lives in every respect[,]
agree with one another, or even like one another.‖[20] But black Americans, like other
individuals, are more than their chosen or assigned racial identity. They have multiple
identities that intersect or overlap in ways not anticipated by law‘s conventional unitary
approach to race-based discrimination. Increasingly these cultural and imposed identities
influence both how we see ourselves and how others see us in America. The political and
cultural division between black ethnics is an example of multiplicity within a racialized
legal identity—black multiplicity.
Black multiplicity is a subset of racialized identity, not another category of identity like
class, gender or sexuality. For example, ethnicity within a racialized group may
influence how racial bias is experienced. Recently arrived Afro-Caribbean immigrants
may be preferred over native-born black Americans because the former often are
stereotyped as hard working individuals who hold multiple jobs as compared to the more
negative stereotypes advanced about conventional black Americans as lazy. Similarly,
Afro-Latinas/os might be treated or perceived as being different from black descendants
of American slaves because of their Latin ethnicity. In other words, they may not be seen
as black. Thus the racialized portion of one‘s identity does not operate in a unitary
fashion.
The problem of different racialization among black Americans is not limited to children
of interracial parentage. Skin tone privilege – colorism - is widely believed to confer
privileges on visibly identified conventional light-skinned black Americans without

regard to parentage. But courts have difficulty recognizing and accepting that black
Americans can experience discrimination differently based on parentage, phenotype and
ethnicity.
The public discourse about President Obama‘s racial authenticity suggests the emergence
of a different type of intra-racial privilege among black Americans. Having one white
parent may confer an actual or perceived racial privilege even on a self-identified African
American. For example, one writer asks: ―What makes [Obama] ‗black‘ rather than
‗white‘?....Socially, he is as white as he is black…. he had to learn how to be black in the
social world…and even had to be mentored by a friend at school to learn how to ‗act
black‘…. He seems to see himself as a human bridge . . . . His blackness is largely a
figment of white imaginings.‖ [21] Further, this different racial status attaches without
regard to the individual‘s racial performance. In other words, whether one racially
identifies as white, black or mixed-race, where interracial parentage is known, one is
considered by the public, but not the courts, as less conventionally black.
There are a few employment cases where claimants alleged discrimination because of
their mixed-race status.[22] The courts in these cases refuse to treat discrimination based
on interracial parentage as a basis for a race discrimination claim. Instead they tend to
adopt a mono-racial approach, looking for discrimination based on the race of one parent
rather than on interracial parentage itself.
If interracial parentage confers a perceived different racialized identity on individuals
who appear phenotypically black, then the perception of privilege may be even stronger
for individuals whose physical appearance is more racially ambiguous. These individuals
may be seen and treated as inauthentic black Americans because of their appearance and
parentage. This perception commonly held both intra-racially and inter-racially is even
more problematic when the result is discriminatory decision-making. Courts are even
less prepared to handle these cases using conventional race anti-discrimination law. This
point is examined briefly in the next section of this chapter.
III. Loving’s Racially Ambiguous Children – – Maria O’Brien Hylton
The controversy surrounding consideration of Maria O‘Brien Hylton for a tenure-track
position at Northwestern Law School illustrates another aspect of the issue about postLoving, post-black blackness, at least for anti-discrimination law purposes. Unlike
President Obama, whose physical appearance comports more with conventional notions
about who ―looks black‖ and who openly identifies as black, Professor Hylton, the sister
of CNN commentator Soledad O‘Brien and wife of a black law professor, looks more
racially ambiguous. Her racial ambiguity might free her from everyday racism like racial
profiling while shopping or driving a car. Nevertheless, she may experience race-based
discrimination in situations where her remote African ancestry is known and used as a
factor in making adverse employment decisions.
When Professor Hylton applied for a faculty position at Northwestern Law School, a
senior black faculty member called her black identity into question in essence asking her

―How black are you?‖[23] Applying the factors considered by the court in the Malone
Brothers case Professor Hylton clearly satisfies the genealogical test. Her mother‘s AfroCuban ancestry would satisfy the genealogical test establishing her partial black
ancestry. So she would be considered black for anti-discrimination purposes even though
her physical appearance does not clearly signal her black ancestry. The court in the
Malone Brothers case suggested that any of the three tests, phenotypical, genealogical or
cultural could be used to establish racial identity. But genealogy was not enough for
some non-white members of the law school community. They complained that not only
did Professor Hylton not look black, some doubted whether she culturally identified as a
black American.
There were conflicting accounts about whether she self- identified as black, at least in
conventional U.S. terms. To further complicate matters, a Latino law student group said
Hylton was not Latino because they felt she identified more with being black than being
Latino—suggesting that these are mutually exclusive categories. Professor Hylton
initially refused to be drawn into what seemed like a discussion of identity politics telling
―the New York Times that she did not define herself in ‗racial terms‘ . . . . However, in a
Boston Globe interview, [she] reported that she identified herself as ‗Black‘ on a form
she completed as a clerk for a federal judge. . . . had been a member of Black
organizations in college, in law school, and while practicing. . . . [saying] ‗I have always
thought of myself as black.‘‖[24] The controversy ended when she and her husband
accepted a job at a northeastern law school. Professor Hylton has gone on to have a
successful academic career.
Professor Hylton was targeted because of her physical appearance and perceived cultural
identification. Without question, ―phenotype goes a long way in facilitating racial
identity because it is the foundation for the social interaction with others by which one
largely comes to identify one‘s self.‖[25] Some social scientists speculate that ―profitmaximizing firms and utility-maximizing individuals have a preference for blacks with
light skin hues.‖[26] Thus, individual members of the same race, even those like
President Obama who appear visibly black, may be treated differently based on
phenotypical characteristics, including skin tone. These preferences are most obvious in
employment settings.
Indeed, racially ambiguous children of interracial parentage with some black ancestry
may have even more difficulty navigating mixed-race ancestry. They are
disproportionally the beneficiaries of various forms of skin tone and/or appearance
privilege. Skin tone discrimination, or colorism, is related to, but different from, racial
passing, a second form of skin tone privilege where self-identified or racially classified
black Americans with light skin tones are either misclassified as white, or are seen as
racially ambiguous, as opposed to black.
The preference for light skin tones may be a result of unconscious bias, what Jerry Kang
calls ―racial mechanics—the ways in which race alters intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
inter-group interactions.‖[27] There are explicit and implicit racial meanings assigned to
the racial categories created by law and cultural practices; and the racial meanings

associated with these categories are triggered when we interact with others. As a result,
implicit racial biases—negative stereotypes and prejudices—influence our interactions.
These reactions are automatic in the sense that they are unintentional and outside the
actor‘s awareness.
A few empirical studies found that unconscious or automatic negative stereotype biases
influence decision-making.[28] Further, there is evidence that skin tone affects wages,
employment opportunities, access to healthcare, and even the accumulation of
intergenerational wealth. Individuals with features most commonly attributed to black
Africans are likely to be judged more harshly than members of the same formal racial
with less ―Afrocentric‖ features as a result of automatic or implicit racial attitudes.[29] It
should be noted, however, that lighter skin African Americans also experience
discrimination, albeit in a different manner from their ―darker‖ counterparts. The
perceived and actual benefits racially ambiguous individuals with some African ancestry
gain in securing employment triggers resentment among more racially identifiable black
Americans. As Professor Hylton‘s case demonstrates, such ―benefits‖ may even result in
adverse employment decisions.
Several factors distinguish Professor Hylton‘s case from a conventional colorism case.
First, unlike most colorism claims, her light-skin did not confer an economic advantage,
but rather resulted in a disadvantage. Second, both blacks and Latina/os at the law school
questioned her racial ―authenticity.‖ Unlike President Obama, her mixed-raced
parentage had both a racial and ethnic component. Latina/os questioned her ethnic
authenticity suggesting that she must choose between being black and being Latina/o
leaving no room to embrace all aspects of her parentage, her mother‘s Afro-Cuban
background and her father‘s Australian-Irish ancestry. Her choice was to identify as
either black or a de-racialized Latina.
Racial ambiguous individuals of interracial parentage like Professor Hylton are more
likely to experience situational race, ―racially biased conduct [that] is situation
sensitive‖[30] because they cannot blend in with more visible black Americans. Thus
their ―racial authenticity‖ is constantly being questioned. In contrast, President Obama
visible appearance minimizes or erases his white ancestry unless he or someone else
invokes it.
Scholars use the term ―situational race‖ to denote several different, but related
phenomena. Situational race may refer to what happens to racially ambiguous mixedrace individuals who look non-white, but not identifiably black. Thus a person who self
identifies as black and who has some African ancestry may be ―misidentified‖ as
belonging to some other racialized group and treated accordingly.
Maria O‘Brien Hylton‘s experience at Northwestern, however, does not neatly fit within
the racial misclassification category. Her opponents knew about her remote African
ancestry. But her racially ambiguous appearance and interracial parentage cause nonwhites to conclude that the genealogical connection was insufficient for minority
representational purposes. They demanded information about her cultural identity. In

the end their criteria for rejecting her as a minority faculty representation was based on
subjective criteria that was ―racially biased‘ and ―situation sensitive‖—situational
blackness.
Situational blackness, unlike situational race, is not limited to racial misclassification
(appearance) or cultural identity. Situational blackness also incorporates aspects of
performative race, focusing on factors like parentage, education, socio-economic status
and the circumstances triggering the racial identification of the individual. Thus media
discussions of President Obama‘s race are instances of situational blackness where they
mention his white mother, his Harvard education, and relatively affluent adult lifestyle.
What is operating in these situations is a complex formula of racialization resulting in an
unstable definition of blackness. Blackness in the twenty-first century no longer is
determined solely by ancestry but is shaded by factors like parentage, education,
appearance, cultural identification and socio-economic factors.
Courts are unprepared for the more complex race cases presented by children of
interracial parentage. Anti-discrimination jurisprudence is based on notions of racial
immutability – racial status as static, unchanging.[31] The Northwestern Law School
Community used a mono-racial, mono-ethnic approach to define Professor Hylton‘s
racial identity. Similarly, courts traditionally resolve discrimination claims by mixedraced individuals using a mono-racial approach that fails to capture the essence of the
claims. This point is discussed briefly in the next section.
IV. The Need for New Theories to Address Employment Discrimination
As mentioned previously, race discrimination based on appearance is more likely to be
automatic or unconscious, while discrimination based on known ancestry is more likely
intentional, but less common. Falling somewhere between is racial decision-making
based on stereotypic notions about differences between blacks based on ethnic group
membership, or in the case of Loving‘s children, interracial parentage. This latter form of
race-related discrimination whether intentional or unintentional results in employment
preferences based on multiple aspects of an individual‘s identity that the law fails to
recognize.
The unitary way law treats race-based discrimination as affecting all black Americans
equally and remediably only if intentional is insufficient to handle the increasingly
complex forms of race-related discrimination. To illustrate this point lets reconsider
what might have happened had Maria O‘Brien Hylton filed an employment
discrimination claim against Northwestern Law School for racial discrimination in
hiring. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Under this provision Professor
Hylton‘s chances of success might depend on the law school‘s subsequent actions.
If the law school subsequently hired a ―black‖ law professor for the position for which
Professor Hylton was considered, some courts might conclude there was no race-based

discrimination because they law school simply preferred one qualified black candidate
over another. If the law school hired a ―Latino‖ law professor for the position a few
courts might inquire more closely to determine, where possible, whether Professor
Hylton and the successful candidate, were of the same race. A very few courts seem
willing to recognize intra- ethnic discrimination among Latina/os because of their mixed
ancestry then intra-racial discrimination claims.[32] But these cases usually involve
Latina/os plaintiffs with phenotypical characteristics closely associated with black
Americans. Where the parties are racially ambiguous courts assume no racial bias.
Courts literally tend to see race in black and white terms – racial absolutes.
When the claim is inter-ethnic, courts tend to treat all racially ambiguous Latina/os alike.
These courts fail to appreciate the racial overtones and anti-black bias in inter-ethnic
employment discrimination claims by Latina/os because of the myth that racism,
particularly anti-black bias, does not exist in racially mixed Latin America.[33] So if the
Latina/o candidate selected was not Cuban, then these courts would conclude there was
no viable race discrimination claim.
Each of these approaches ignores a key aspect of Professor Hylton‘s potential
employment discrimination claim. It is not merely whether the employer hired a black or
Latina/o applicant but whether the trigger for the discrimination she experienced was her
interracial parentage. If so then the employment decision was based on the impermissible
use of race and should be actionable. Yet courts, stuck in their mono-racial approach to
race-based discrimination, are uncomfortable with claims brought by mixed-raced
litigants wanting to assign the basis of discrimination to one race rather than to the
interracial status of the claimant.
One possible solution would be to expand racial discrimination jurisprudence to include
discrimination based on interracial parentage. On its face this approach seems like a
simple solution, but it ignores more than fifty years of race discrimination jurisprudence
grounds in mono-racialism. Judges, without specific guidelines, would look to this older
body of race law for guidance, easily slipping back into a mono-racial approach.
An alternative approach would be to create an entirely new case of action that rejects the
notion of racial immutability as a foundation for a discrimination claim recognizing intraand inter-racial discrimination claims based on interracial parentage and colorism.
Instead, the courts‘ focus would be on whether phenotype, ancestry or cultural identity of
a claimant was a factor in employment decision-making. If so, then the inquiry would
focus on whether consideration of these factors was permissible under the law.
But one problem with this approach is whether to retain the intent requirement for
actionable race discrimination claims. Even though the type of discrimination Hylton
experienced was intentional, as mentioned previously, much race-based discrimination
today is unconscious – unintentional. Given the unconsciousness of much race-based
decision-making, in many cases it may be impossible to establish intent to discriminate
based on interracial parentage. Abandoning racial immutability as applied in race

discrimination law would require a rethinking of anti-discrimination principles generally.
This is a big agenda fraught with landmines.
V. Conclusion
In many ways President Barack Obama‘s family reminds us of what the United States
might have looked like had the politicians and courts of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century not worked so hard to enforce racial segregation, anti-miscegenation
and exclusion of non-whites. His white mother, Ann Dunham, has a son who self
identifies as black, and a daughter, Maya Soetoro-Ng, who self identifies as ―hybrid‖;
―half white‖ and ―half Asian.‖ Obama‘s sister sees nothing unusual about the fact that
her brother ―named himself‖ black and she named herself hybrid, reasoning that ―[e]ach
of us has a right to name ourselves as we will.‖ [34] Further, Soetoro-Ng is married to a
Chinese-Canadian and has one child, so President Obama‘s two daughters have a first
cousin with Chinese, Indonesian and white ancestry. Adding more spices to the mix,
Soetoro-Ng‘s racially ambiguous appearance causes her to be misidentified as Latina so
she learned Spanish. President Obama and his sister were raised in Hawaii, the most
multiracial state in the Union and their families and perspectives reflect different attitudes
about racial identity that twentieth century-made laws are ill-equipped to handle.
We face a bumpy road ahead in developing more precise and searching definitions of
actionable ―race‖ discrimination; the old formula labels are outmoded and no longer
reflect the new direction the Loving era children are taking us. The challenge in twentyfirst century America is to develop more flexible and realistic legal theories that allow
people the freedom to choose their identities without being defined by them, while at the
same time guarding against the pernicious and arbitrary use of ancestry to confer
privilege or burdens on segments of Americans.
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